Market Impact Paradoxes by Skachkov, Igor
Market Impact Paradoxes
Igor Skachkov
iskachkov@yahoo.com
December 13, 2013
Abstract
The market impact (MI) of Volume Weighted Average Price (VWAP ) orders is a convex
function of a trading rate, but most empirical estimates of transaction cost are concave functions.
How is this possible? We show that isochronic (constant trading time) MI is slightly convex,
and isochoric (constant trading volume) MI is concave. We suggest a model that fits all trading
regimes and guarantees no-dynamic-arbitrage.
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1 Introduction
In a recent paper by Farmer et al. [12] (FGLW ) the authors name three reasons for studying market
impact: theoretical (market impact shape reflects general laws of economics), ecological (market
impact makes large fund managers diversify their assets) and practical (correct evaluation of market
impact is essential for optimal trading strategies).
In this paper we focus almost entirely on the practical aspect of market impact theory. More
precisely we try to find the functional form of market resilience to large parent order execution.1.
Unfortunately empirical data are controversial, they are aggregated and filtered under different and
not transparent conditions and sometimes are not consistently interpreted. In this section we give
short description of the market impact kernels that allow close form analytical solutions for optimal
trading trajectories. In section 2 we present a diffusion kernel and in the next sections we show how
this model can help to resolve the paradoxes between market impact theory and empirical data.
Analytical market impact models In short time horizon we assume the price S dynamics:
S = S0 + h[x] + S0σWt (1)
where h[x] is a temporary market impact functional that in general depends on execution history and
S is the mid-price, i.e. the average price of Best Bid and Offer (BBO) quotes.
h[x] =
∫ t
0
f(q(τ))K(t− τ)dt (2)
Market impact kernel K(τ, t) is assumed to be a convex monotonic decreasing function, homogenous
in time K(τ, t) = K(t− τ) .
GKAC model At the end of the last century Grinold and Kahn (1999) [17] and Almgren and
Chriss (1999) [2, 3, 4] (GKAC) independently pioneered application of calculus of variation to the
problem of portfolio liquidation. Today most modern trading engines use different modifications of
their method.
They suggested mean-variance utility
Φ =
∫ t
0
(E(R)− λ˜V ar(R))dt
1I am used to the term parent order for a large order that should be executed during the current trading session or in
the next few days and the term child order for the fraction of the parent order that would be directly submitted to the
exchange. I suspect that these terms came from developers of trading applications and were inherited from C++/Java
languages syntaxis. Another term hidden order is a descriptive term from the point of view of high frequency traders
who try to detect those large orders. The term hidden order is also applied to the exchange orders not displayed to the
market. (FGLW ) used the term metaorder and I will use this name interchangeably with parent order
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that is given by the functional
Φ[x] =
∫ T
0
(h[x]x˙− λ˜(Sxσ)2)dt (3)
Calculating variations 2 we obtain the following equation
2k2x =
d
dt
∫ T
0
x˙(τ)K(|t− τ |)dτ (4)
R is an absolute asset price return in $
V ar is a variance
T is a time horizon.
X0 and XT are initial and terminal position in a stock
x is the current position
x˙ is its time derivative
trading rate q = −x˙ is positive when cash flow goes in
η is a coefficient of temporary market impact
η˜ = η σADV S0
ADV is an Average Daily Volume
λ˜ is a risk-averse parameter.
λ = k2 = λ˜/η˜
f(q) is reduced to a linear function of trading rate, f = −η˜x˙
The simplest form of the convolution integral kernel was proposed
K(t) = δ(t), Dirac′s delta function
and a nice analytical solution obtained
x (t) = X0
sinh (k(T − t))
sinh (kT )
+XT
sinh (kt)
sinh (kT )
(5)
Exponential kernel The solution (5) is an acceptable approximation for optimal trajectories
in practice, but it cannot describe the market impact of a single discrete trade (it is a delta-function).
The instantaneous recovery assumption is unrealistic and inconsistent with calibration procedures.
2
δx˙Φ =
∫ T
0
[δ(x˙(t))
∫ t
0
x˙(τ)K(t− τ)dτ + x˙(t)
∫ t
0
δ(x˙(τ))K(t− τ)dτ ]dt
We change the order of integration for the second integral and get
δx˙Φ =
∫ T
0
∫ T
0
x˙(τ)K(|t− τ |)dτδ(x˙(t))dt
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To resolve these problems one has to replace the delta function with a smooth kernel. The next step
after Dirac’s delta function is the exponential kernel
K(t) ∼ exp(−βt)
The general solution for the optimal trajectories would be given by
x = C1e
kt + C2e
−kt +D1H(t) +D2H(t− T ) (6)
where H(t) is a Heavyside’s function. We need four equations to find four arbitrary constants.
Two equations represent initial and terminal conditions and two additional equations follow from the
requirement that x(t) doesn’t have exp(±βt) terms. After some simple but tedious algebra we get a
solution in a familiar form:
x (t) = X0B
sinh ((k(T − t) +A)
sinh (kT + 2A)
+XTB
sinh (kt)
sinh (kT + 2A)
where
A = ln
√
β + k
β − k , B =
k√
λ
, k2 =
λβ2
λ+ β2
(7)
More detailed derivation and more general solution can be found in Skachkov [24]. For risk-neutral
traders (λ → 0) the optimal schedule under exponential impact relaxation is a combination of two
jumps and straight line between them.
lim
λ→0
x = (X0 −∆X0)T − t
T
+ (XT + ∆XT )
t
T
∆X0 = ∆XT =
X0 −XT
βT + 2
(8)
Optimal trading strategy with the exponential kernel was the subject of Obizhaeva and Wang
study [22]. They were the first to point out that discontinuity of optimal paths at the ends of a time
interval and to derive optimal risk-neutral trajectories (8). With β → ∞ our result (7) goes to the
classic solution (5).
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2 Market impact as a diffusion process
This is a scheme of a drill stem test.
Figure 1: A drill stem test.
Figure 2: drawdown and buildup tests. The well
worked with the constant rate, then it was closed
Two models for the kernel of convolution integral are natural first choices due to their simplicity.
In both cases we have analytical solution for optimal trajectory. The GKAC model is memoryless and
it means that the history of trading is unimportant. With exponential decay (market perturbations
decay the same way as radioactivity) we also don’t need to know the full history - only the current state
matters. This is a great relief for the developers of trading engines. If the program was interrupted, it
can be restarted from scratch with new values for stock positions or with a single additional parameter
- the difference between expected current price and expected equilibrium price. Both models proved
their usefulness for trade scheduling in a continuous regime. Unfortunately both of them contradict the
empirical evidence of market long memory. It is almost generally accepted that market perturbations
decay as a power law and that the square root is a good approximation in practice. Another desirable
property is the absence of price manipulation strategies, i.e. the possibility to make money on a
round trip (X0 = XT ) execution. This regularity condition was introduced by Huberman and Stanzl
[19] and analyzed in details by Gatheral [13] and, in a later review, by Gatheral and Schied [14].
Some models do not admit price manipulation but their optimal execution trajectories may oscillate
strongly between buy and sell trades [1]. This is a common problem with the fitting of real natural or
social phenomena by abstract functions. To avoid the complications of odd effects of arbitrary general
functions we borrow a model under which good behavior is guaranteed. A promising candidate for the
decay kernel is the solution of a diffusion equation. The transmission of pressure in a porous medium
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filled by slightly compressible fluid is governed by a system of linear parabolic equation and initial
and boundary conditions:
ft − κfxx = 0, 0 < x < x2
f(x, t) = h(t), −x1 < x < 0
(9)
where κ is a diffusion coefficient, and subscripts t and x denote partial derivatives with respect to
time and space variables.
f(0, x) = 0
h(t) = f(t, 0)
c · ht = q(t) + κfx, x = 0
(10)
Initially the distribution is uniform. The inner boundary conditions are: the first equation is the
continuity of pressure (price) and the second is the balance of cash (liquid) flow and wellbore storage,
q(t) is a known trading (flow) rate and Q(t) is a cumulative amount traded, q = Qt. We assumed that
the flow is a linear function of price gradient - that is Darcy’s law in a porous medium fluid mechanics
or Fourier’s law in heat transfer.
The outer boundary condition at x = x2 ≤ ∞ allows to model permanent impact of trading flow
to the equilibrium price in market (reservoir) with finite capacity.
fx = 0 (impenetrable wall at x = x2), (11)
The solution of the system (10) in Laplace domain
h¯ =
q¯
cs+ κ
√
s
κ tanh(
√
s
κx2)
= q¯K¯ (12)
where y¯ denotes Laplace transform: y¯ = Ly. We focus on temporary impact in this paper and don’t
consider very long trading times. With the assumption that the outer border of our reservoir is much
greater than the radius of investigation √
s
κ
x2  1
the solution (12) can be simplified and analytically inverted back to time domain
K¯ =
1
cs+
√
sκ
(13)
hδ(t) = K(t) = c
−1 · exp(t˜) · erfc(
√
t˜), (14)
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where erfc(t) is a complimentary error integral erfc(t) = 1− erf(t).
t˜ =
κ
c2
t
Immediately after the shock
K(0) = c−1 (15)
Then perturbation decays as an inverse square root of time
K(t) ' 1√
piκt
, x2
2  t˜ 1, (16)
to the permanent value
K(∞) = 1
c+ x2
(17)
The market impact of a constant unit rate of trade q(t) ≡ 1 is an integral of Green’s function or
source function. In Laplace domain the integration is just division by the Laplace variable s. As a free
gift from the integral transform approach we can invert the equation (12) for market impact with the
given trading rate and get the required rate that would sustain predefined price value. For example,
if we want to keep the constant price difference with arrival price ∆S, we need after initial shot (q is
Dirac delta function at the initial time) trade with the decreasing as square root of time rate.
q = cδ(t) +
√
κ
pit
(18)
Correspondingly, to sustain S ∝ tα price growth, trading rate
q = c · αtα−1 +√κtα− 12 Γ(α+ 1)
Γ(α+ 12 )
(19)
is required.
With the choice of diffusion process as a base for market dynamics we are guaranteed from surprises
like oscillating optimal trajectories and dynamic arbitrage [13], [14]. The transaction cost in terms of
porous hydrodynamics is the work (wealth) that needed to do for the process:
∆W =
∫ V (T )
V0
PdV (t) (20)
where P is a pressure (expected stock price), and V (t) is a volume (current volume traded). The pro-
cess is adiabatic, i.e. there is no exchange of heat (information) between a system and its environment.
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According to the first law of thermodynamics
∆W =
∮
PdV (t) ≥ 0 (21)
Replacing ‘thermo’ by ‘mercato’ 3 we can postulate:
For a mercatodynamics cycle, the wealth supplied to a closed system, minus that removed from it,
equals the net payment made by the system. It is not possible to construct a perpetuum mobile machine
which will continuously trade without consuming wealth.
Diffusion model is rich and elaborated, has a huge library of the problems in physics and engi-
neering, that were solved and analyzed in details: namely in classic theory of conduction of heat in
solids [10] and in porous media hydrodynamics and modern oil and gas well test engineering [18]. For
example, we can consider ‘skin effect’ at the inner border of our ‘reservoir’ or dual porosity (fractures
- matrix) formation to model various deviation from standard behavior. Nonlinear problems of real
gas pseudo-pressure dynamics are also well developed. Figures 1 and 2 show the drill stem test (DST)
and plot pressure versus time during the drawdown and buildup periods of DST. Additionally, we
are free to choose our space dimension D: arbitrary dimension diffusion equations lead to the same
type modified Bessel equations. Asymptotic behavior for the stock price that is being traded with the
constant rate q
h(t) ∼ q
t1−D/2, D < 2ln(t), D = 2 (22)
The inverse Laplace transform of equation 12 for market impact decay is the main technical result of
this paper.
K(t) = L−1 1
cs+ κ
√
s
κ tanh(
√
s
κx2)
(23)
There is no practical need for finding any analytical simplifications in time domain, because the
modern numerical inverse Laplace transform algorithms are fast and accurate (see references in [23])
for such a smooth function as a diffusion equation solution. Of course, similar, but not the same
results can be obtained by choosing the arbitrary power function
K(t) = C0 +
C1
(t0 + t)α
(24)
At this point we can consider the well-reservoir system as an augmented space and space dimension
x as an auxiliary dimension that allowed us to get a solution free of dynamic arbitrage and oscillations
by construction. In the next section, we find the physical meaning of the coefficients of diffusion and
wellbore storage and try to interpret space variable x.
3Latin word mercatus - market + a Greek word δυναµις (dynamis)- power. The name Agorodynamics (Greek αγoρα
(agora) - market) is more consistent etymologically
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3 Paradoxes in Market Impact Theory
We derived a comparatively simple linear model that is dynamic arbitrage proof and correctly describes
decay of market perturbations. In this section we are going to reconcile it with the numerous empirical
evidences that market impact is a concave function of a trading rate for large parent orders and that
VWAP algorithm performance is flat if market participation is small (< 1%) and then slightly convex
[9] up to 50% ADV . The good news is that those facts contradict each other.
Instantaneous market impact While market impact and price impact sometimes considered syn-
onymous4, this is obviously not the case for instantaneous or impulse impacts. Mean relative depth
profiles of Limit Order Book (LOB) exhibit a hump shape in a wide range of markets, including the
Paris Bourse, NASDAQ, the Stockholm Stock Exchange , and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The
maximal mean depth available for SPY was reported to occur at best bid and best ask levels, which
could also be considered as a hump with its maximum at a price of Best Bid and Offer (BBO) [16].
This means that ‘unbiased‘ instantaneous price impact should have a complex shape: first concave,
then convex. We exclude the convex instantaneous impact as an almost purely theoretical artifact.
In reality, this scenario only occurs when an accidently wrong big order with a wrong limit (nobody
places pure market orders) sweeps a few best bid/ask levels of the book. Almost surely it is the
human error of a programmer or a manual trader (or an indication of price manipulation). In most
cases impulse price impact is equal to zero, otherwise it is equal to 1 tick for liquid stocks [15]. In
contrast, instantaneous market impact is never zero in response to nonzero perturbation of LOB and
it is non-measurable directly. For example, we want to buy 200 shares of XY Z and see 1000 on both
sides of BBO. We submit either limit order on bid price or market order on ask. In both cases
mid price is not changed and in both cases we expect that in some future time the market for XY Z
would be a bit higher. We don’t know in advance the actual sizes of BBO, we don’t know if hidden
orders exist inside the spread - all we know is that immediate mid-price is the same and immediate
micro-mid-price (mid-quote-price weighted by bid and ask sizes) changed proportionally to the size of
our order.
The empirical studies by Cont, Kukanov and Stoikov [11] support that simple heuristic. They used
one calendar month (April, 2010) of trades and quotes data (TAQ) for a set of 50 S&P500 stocks and
introduced order flow imbalance, a variable that cumulates the sizes of order book events, treating the
contributions of market, limit and cancel orders equally, and provided evidence for a linear relation
between high-frequency price changes (from 50 milliseconds to 10 seconds) and order flow imbalance
for individual stocks. Extracting concrete numbers from market data is a job that never guarantees
conclusive results: the samples cannot be representative without access to proprietary information,
data is not clean enough and some filtration with additional assumptions is needed, e.g. for relaxation
time. Data preprocessing is never neutral: it filters out ‘biased’ (actually conditioned to intelligence of
4A comprehensive introduction to the modern state of a market microstructure theory and a survey of recent
publications was presented by Gould et. al [16]
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the engine and a trader who monitors it) and favors mechanical style execution. For example, WVAP
algorithm should stop execution if experiences severe adverse selection and sharp unfavorable price
jumps - and this is the result of a good engine, not bad data.
There is another and better way to evaluate instantaneous impact: to take average execution
performance in of VWAP orders with low participation rate, say 0.1 − 2% for liquid stocks. The
numbers would be close in mean-variance sense across large brokerages. Information about real trading
engines is highly proprietary. Each institution has ‘unique’ set of algorithms usually with fancy names
and promises the best in the world and flexible execution. And they actually can be very different
in some internal details. For example, Toth et.al [26] demonstrated the heterogeneity of London
Stock Exchange (LSE) broker liquidity provision. Some use limit orders almost exclusively, others
predominately use market orders.5 However, those details don’t cause dramatic differences in engine
performances: all major brokers have to provide cost-variance quasi-efficient order execution to clients.
The performances of major trading engines are similar regardless of order type preferences, and this
is a proof that market and limit orders with the high probability to be executed have similar impacts.
For an oversimplified short description of a trading engine see Appendix A.
The engines usually generate the orders of typical for that particular stock size. Randomization of
schedule and sizes can help to hide the intentions of directional traders from high frequency predators,
but the picture for small and moderate in market participation transactions remains the same6. We
posit
Efficient Trading Hypothesis (ETH). Algorithmic trading is efficient.
Corrollary 1. Parent orders are optimally split into child orders.
Corrollary 2. The implementation shortfall has the minimum: it is the best transaction cost per
share that can be achieved in one sided trading.
Continuous trading approximation doesn’t work for low market participation VWAP algorithm.
Instead of
∆W =
1
Q
∫ T
0
q(t)
∫ t
0
q(τ)K(t− τ)dτdt (25)
we have to evaluate discrete equation
∆W =
1
2Q
N∑
j=1
N∑
j=1
qjqiK(|tj − ti|) (26)
5Actually the first approach is impossible with high market participation
6Consider the (VWAP) algorithm, that places the orders each 1000th trade. The shock that the market experienced
after execution of our order probably would be mostly forgotten after 999 similar shocks of different signs. The same
would be probably true for 1% market participation. It means that the response for the small infrequent perturbations
is almost constant while the interactions between them are negligible.
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If we assume equal child orders qi = q˜ and large enough intervals between their submissions t˜i+1− t˜i 
1,
∆W =
1
2
(q˜K(0) +QK(∞)), Q ADV (27)
Figures 3 and 4 clearly show this situation: the cost of continuous trading grows linearly with
Figure 3: Market impact due to discrete and con-
tinuous trading. Isochronic regime, i.e. trading time
T is constant T = 0.5 days. Single order size Qn =
1e−4ADV . Number of trades: 1, 2, 4 . . . , 1024. Shown
2− 16 and 128− 1024 cases.
Figure 4: Loglog plot for trading cost versus trading
rate from a Figure at left. Discrete (green line) and
continuous (blue line) trading
Figure 5: Market impact due to discrete and con-
tinuous trading. Isochoric regime, i.e trading volume
Q = 12·1e−4ADV is constant. First plot time horizon
is 8 days. Then we divide time by 2 16 times. Shown
first and last 4 simulations.
Figure 6: Loglog plot for trading cost versus trading
rate from a Figure at left. Discrete (green line) and
continuous (blue line) trading
trading rate, time of trade given. The cost of discrete trades is almost constant at the beginning (16
trades make 1.25 times greater impact than the single trade) and then goes asymptotically to the
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linear function. Soohun Kim and Dermot Murphy [20] recently reported that “the average size of an
individual transaction has substantially and steadily decreased over time - the average size of a buy
or sell order in 1997 is 5,600 shares, while in 2009, it is only 400 shares. However, over this same
time period, the average number of consecutive buy or sell transactions has significantly increased,
from 2.3 consecutive buy or sell orders in 1997 to 11.9 in 2009”. This process is still continuing.
The average size of an order executed on the NYSE and NASDAQ has declined from 600 shares in
2003 to less than 200 shares in 2010 [6]. It means that unattainable area between green and blue
lines on Figure 4 is shrinking. We used diffusion model for simulation, but in an isochronic regime
the concrete form of a reasonable (smooth and monotonic decreasing) kernel is not important . For
example, an exponential kernel would generate a similar loglog plot with the flat part even flatter. In
empirical studies it would be easy to take those convex curves for slowly growing concave functions,
e.g., power or even logarithmic, especially when additional point (0, 0) is tacitly assumed. Note, that
R2 for model parameters calibrations in this case is less than 1%.
Fitting VWAP data means calibration by millions of transactions made entirely by directional
traders. VWAP is just the most popular and easy to interpret algorithm of trading. In general, Effi-
cient Trading Hypothesis stipulates the shape of market impact for real market conditions, naturally
weighted and balanced. It is a benchmark for any theoretical models and empirical studies of market
impact.
Square Root Dependence of Market Impact on Trading Volume The most popular and
generally accepted by practitioners estimation for transaction cost is
∆W = C1 + C2 · σ ·
√
Q
ADV
(28)
where C1 and C2 are constants. Almgren et al. [5] analyzed almost 700, 000 (29, 509
7 after filtering)
US stock trade orders. They had a maximum of 548 executions per order with a median around 5
and the median time around one-half hour. Their empirical studies result in the similar power law.
h = η · σ · sgn(q) ·
∣∣∣∣ QADV · T
∣∣∣∣β , β ≈ 0.6 (29)
Uniform rate of trading over a volume time interval T was assumed q, Q = qT . Therefore, temporary
impact
h = η · σ · sgn(q) ·
∣∣∣ q
ADV
∣∣∣β (30)
Conventional wisdom and rigorous data mining both suggest a similar concave dependance of
market impact on trading volume. It seems that the only way to follow this formula is to assume a
7Statistical laws are much less applicable to market analysis than to statistical physics. Compare the size of that
sample (' 3× 104) with the characteristic sample size in chemistry - Avagadro’s number ' 6× 1023 mol−1.
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nonlinear impact function.And now partial relaxation after discrete trades cannot help. The equation
(28) was presented as a generalization of a trading rule of thumb that it costs roughly one day volatility
to trade one day’s volume. With that volume we are definitely in a continuous trading regime. It
seems that our attempt to reconcile linear instant impact and concave impact of continuous trading
failed. To understand what happened, let us look at the more general equations. The cost of a trade
at a constant rate is the twice integrated market impact kernel
∆W = η
f(q)q
Q
∫ T
0
dt
∫ t
0
K(τ)dτ = η
f(q)
T
K−2(T ) (31)
In GKAC model K(t) = δ(t), K−1(t) = 1, K−2(t) = t and
∆W = η · f(q)
The SKAC model temporary impact depends only on trading rate. The specific numerical examples
of permanent and temporary impact costs for two large-cap stocks were shown in (Table 3) of [5]. The
execution of 10% of ADV shares was completed in 0.5, 0.2 and 0.1 days. Temporary impact of both
stocks purchases follows the law (30). Those examples directly state that
∆W ∝ σ · T−β |Q=const ∝ σ · qβ |Q=const (32)
We illustrated an isochoric regime of trading on Figures 5 and 6. The value of the exponent β = 0.6
in [5] could be explained by a mixed regime in their analysis. 8
Grinold & Kahn [17] give an elegant heuristic derivation of this equation (28), (chapter 16,
Equation 16.4). They explain that liquidation time is proportional to the size of stock inventory
(chapter 16, Equation 16.1). In our notation
T ∝ Q
ADV
(33)
Substituting into (28), we get
∆W − C1 ∝ σ ·
√
T (34)
Again, a more thorough look at this example doesn’t confirm concave dependance of temporary
market impact on trading rate in an isochronic regime. The assumption under equation (28) was not
a fixed time of execution, but an Efficient Trading Hypothesis or, in other words, a professional quality
trading engine that makes a reasonable choice of a trading rate and keeps it. Cost of trade per share
in this isotachic or isokinetic regime q = const is proportional to the square root of time. We don’t
need a special illustration of this regime of trade - each trajectory on Figures 3 and 5 is isotachic.
8In recent paper by J.D Farmer et al. [12] the data in [5] (among others) are considered as a support of a statement:
“The empirical results strongly support concave dependence on size, whereas the dependence on time is an open
question”.
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Recent empirical research by Bershova and Rakhlin [6] confirms square root dependance on time in
an isotachic regime at average. However larger orders in their sample are best approximated by a
logarithmic function. The possible explanation of slower growth is in a more optimal than uniform
rate execution for larger orders. A frontloading, as shown by equations ??, can significantly distort
the square root law. Plugging an asymptotic form of a diffusion kernel (16) into a general equation
for the implementation shortfall (31)
∆W = η · q
T
K−2(T ) = η˜ · 1√
κ
· q ·
√
T , T  1 (35)
Comparing equations (35) and (28), we found the meaning of diffusion coefficient κ in our ‘information
space’. This parameter controls the speed of market response and, therefore, controls the volatility of
a stock.
σ ∼ 1√
κ
(36)
Finally we get a law for all three regimes: if parent order is big enough for continuous rate
approximation and doesn’t exceed critical value that can crash the market
σ ·
√
T · q = σ · Q√
T
= σ ·
√
Q · √q = C ·∆W (37)
For continuous and elastic trading: isochronic (trading time T = const) market impact is linear
on trading rate, isochoric (trading volume Q = const) market impact is proportional to the square root
of trading rate q, and isotachic (trading rate q = const) market impact is proportional to the square
root of trading volume Q.
Noticing that σ · √T is a volatility of stock σT evaluated for period of time 0 < t < T , we can
rewrite (37) in a more balanced and concise form
∆W
σT · q =
∆W · T
σT ·Q = C (38)
4 Results and discussion
The diffusion kernel presented in this paper explains many empirical market impact estimations and
allows square root metaorder market impact and linear instantaneous market impact to coexist. We
consider rehabilitation of a linear impact model as one of the main results of this paper. The impor-
tance of linearity was discussed in B. Toth et al [27] (TLDLKB) 9: “in most systems the response to
a small perturbation is linear, i.e., small disturbances lead to small effects”. In contrast, marginal im-
pact for strictly sublinear power functions is singular at Q = 0. Nevertheless, recognizing that all but
linear behavior is highly non-trivial, they admitted it as a real phenomenon and designed the model
9I want to thank one of the authors, J.-P. Bouchaud, for attracting my attention to this interesting paper
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to justify the anomalous high impact of small trades. Our approach has a lot in common with [27].
As well as in our model of section 2, the price distribution in (TLDLKB) latent order book satisfies
diffusion equation. Market impact and all market movements reflect information flow. We assume
that dissemination of information is a diffusion rather than instantaneous process. It is a requirement
of the law that all news and company statements will be available to all market participants at the
same time, institutional investors obtain exchange data also at the same time. Obviously it is not
a slow and smooth diffusion. What is similar to diffusion is the processing and analysis of publicly
available data by investors with different time horizons. Our model and (TLDLKB) are behavioral
approaches, distinct from a pure simulation of physical object (LOB) in the seminal zero-intelligence
model of [25]. (TLDLKB) analyze the dynamics of market participants’ intentions instead of changes
in the true order book. The V -shaped curve of latent volumes with the tip of V at the current price
was assumed to obtain square root impact.
The diffusion model satisfies the no-dynamic-arbitrage principle and can explain empirical results
for the all regimes of trading:
• Isochronic (constant time - various volume and rate) market impact cost is a linear function of
trading rate.
• Isochoric (constant volume - various time and rate ) market impact cost is a square root function
of trading rate.
• Isotachic or isokinetic (constant rate - various time and volume) market impact cost is a square
root function of trading volume.
• Theoretical market impact and real implementation shortfall are not the same. Market impact
is decreasing to zero with a decreasing trading rate - implementation shortfall has a minimum.
We didn’t touch many important aspects of market impact theory in this paper, e.g., relation
between temporary and permanent impact, Efficient market Hypothesis, fair pricing condition [12]
and supply-demand balance in general. After the work by Kyle [21] (1985) it is common to describe
market dynamics as a contest of three parties: a single insider who has unique knowledge of ‘fair’
price, noise traders who trade randomly; and market makers who set the prices conditional on trading
flow10. But the typical signal of informed long term investors is not interesting for intraday traders
because its daily (information ratio 1), market makers try to close all their positions by the end
of the day and the retail noisy traders tend to trade following the market. This is another paradox:
it is not clear, who is going to take the open positions overnight and why. One can be only sure in
“the subtle nature of ‘random’ price changes” [7] and the subtle nature of the other market laws and
hypotheses.
10(FGLW ) [12] modified the first agent assuming large number of informed traders with the same long term return
prediction.
16
We don’t have the answers to all problems, but we hope to shed some light on them in the next
paper by developing optimal trading strategies.
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A Trading Engine
Trading engine is a complex program consisting of pre and post trade analysis, smart order routing,
order placement, scheduler and other parts. The structure, architecture and the number of the parts,
as well as their names could be different. We describe the basic principles of scheduler and order
placement modules.
The scheduler calculates the optimal trajectory of the parent order(metaorder) trading for each
position. The most common orders are Volume Weighted Average Price (VWAP) and Arrival Price
(AP) [9]. If the order is VWAP, the trajectory is a volume curve - the U -shaped plot of the percentage
of Average Daily Volume (ADV) traded during the day. AP trajectories are optimal in a sense of
expected transaction cost-cost variance tradeoff. The output of a scheduler module is the number of
shares that should be bought/sold in a specific short interval, e.g. 5 min.
The order placement module splits the number of shares for each time bin into small fractions,
typically 100 shares, and submits that lot to the exchange. Depending on evaluated probability to
complete the 5 min portion of the order in time and client risk aversion the aggressiveness parameter
is chosen. In the most aggressive mode, all orders are market orders (actually marketable limit or
Immediate Or Cancel (IOC) ). Otherwise limit orders are being sent inside a spread, on Best Bid and
Offer (BBO) level or deeper into the Limit Order Book (LOB) lot by lot, or as an Iceberg/Reserve
order 11. If the order is not complete at the end of 5 min interval, our primitive engine will send the
rest of it for immediate execution at the last moment. Real order placement also requires continuously
monitoring the state of the market and calculating high frequency signals like LOB imbalance. Some
brokers focus on these signals and predominately use market orders [26]. The threshold of a signal
can change based on aggressiveness level. To understand why waiting is not always the best policy
for getting the best price consider the oversimplified model of the market as a binary tree. Arrival
mid quote price is S0. The return in a unit of time is ±1 tick. If we send market buy order, we expect
the loss
∆W = −0.5
If we send limit order on a best bid price we gain a half spread with market step down or have to put
our order a tick up
∆W = p− · 0.5 + p+ · (∆W − 1), p− = p+ = 0.5
11An Iceberg order allows you to submit an order (generally a large volume order) while publicly disclosing only a
portion of the submitted order.
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and again a binary tree market with equal probabilities of ups (p+) and downs (p−) results the same
loss
∆W = −0.5
Sending market or limit orders in a binary tree market without trading signals makes no difference.
This example also shows that a market with long trends is the worst case scenario for market makers
and the market with constant mid quote prices is the best.
Directional traders with large parent orders compete with high frequency traders. The former
try to hide their intentions and the latter try to detect them. For example, a high frequency trader
can make an artificial imbalance to provoke trading engines to send market orders, then immediately
cancel her limit order that caused that imbalance. This market manipulation, knowing as spoofing,
is the high frequency version of the classic ‘pump-and-dump’. Therefore good trading engines avoid
any exact regularities.
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